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I. INTRODUCTION
Deborah Gunter has extensive retail and management experience.1 With more
than 20 years total experience and three years with her current employer, she
received consistent positive evaluations, and trained herself on equipment and 
practices when her requests for formal training were denied.  During Deborah’s
employment, she repeatedly applied for and was denied a promotion to a specialty
division of the retailer.  She observed the positions she applied for repeatedly being
filled by men, some with fewer qualifications and less experience.  During two years 
1Wal-Mart Class Website, Declaration of Deborah Gunter in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Class Certification, http://www.walmartclass.com/staticdata/walmartclass
/declarations/Gunter_Debra.htm [hereinafter Declaration of Deborah Gunter].
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of employment, Deborah was paid approximately two dollars less than various male 
colleagues in the same position.  This is the story of Deborah “Dee” Gunter,2 one of 
the seven named representatives of the plaintiff class in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc.,3 currently the largest employment discrimination class action in the American 
legal system.4
Christine Kwapnoski, another named representative in the legal action, also has 
a story to tell about her employment at Wal-Mart Stores.5  During her time at Wal-
Mart,6 Christine was given increased responsibilities, outstanding evaluations, and 
merit raises.  However, during this tenure her repeated requests for promotion to 
management were denied, allegedly justified by her people problems.  When finally 
promoted to area manager,7 Christine received recommendations from her supervisor 
to “doll up” and “blow the cobwebs off her makeup.” Claudia Renati was hired as a 
marketing membership team leader and before long, she was given the  tasks and 
responsibilities of a marketing manager.8  Despite her responsibilities, she did not 
receive the corresponding compensation or title.  After two years of increased 
responsibility, Claudia requested a promotion to the actual position corresponding to 
her responsibilities, only to be refused because she had not engaged in the formal 
training program.  After training approximately 20 male managers, some of whom 
did not go through the necessary training nor were required to relocate, and 
continuously being passed over for promotions, Claudia came to the conclusion that 
her employer was engaging in discriminatory behavior based on her gender. 
In 2001, seven named representatives and 114 class members filed declarations9
against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., asserting that they had been paid less than men, that 
they had been denied promotion or had been delayed promotion, and that they had 
been the subjects of various sexist acts.10  Since then, the suit has grown 
substantially; the plaintiff class consists of approximately 1.6 million women who 
were employed by Wal-Mart since 1998.11 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,12 is 
                                                                
2The Wal-Mart class website has declarations from over 100 women across the country 
who were employed by Wal-Mart.  These women have given declarations to provide the court 
with individual testimony and anecdotal evidence to further their claims.  See Wal-Mart Class 
Website, http://www.walmartclass.com.
3Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  
4Id. at 142. 
5See Declaration of Deborah Gunter, supra note 1.  
6Christine Kwapnoski, a named representative is currently still employed by Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. and has worked there since 1986.  See id.
7Shortly after the original claim was filed against Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Christine was 
promoted to the position of area manager. Id.
8See Declaration of Deborah Gunter, supra note 1. 
9Id.
10See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 137.  
11Wal-Mart Class Website, http://www.walmartclass.com.
12Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 137. 
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currently pending as the largest employment discrimination class action suit in 
American history.13
The certification of the Wal-Mart suit has raised numerous questions regarding 
the certification of class actions.  Are these seven women’s personal experiences 
similar enough to the experiences of all 1.6 million female Wal-Mart employees such 
that they can fairly represent the claims in a class action suit?  The defense admits 
that there may be “isolated instances of unfairness,”14 but does not feel that the 
women’s experiences are representative of all 1.6 million class members.  Are the 
representatives’ claims similar enough to the rest of the class to be thought of as 
common and typical?  Did these 1.6 million women all fall victim to discriminatory 
practices and policies in compensation and promotion?  These are some of the issues 
that the legal and corporate worlds are considering as they await the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals review of the certification decision made by the District Court for 
the Northern District of California.  
In previous decisions, the Ninth Circuit has taken a relatively lenient and liberal 
stance on certification of class actions, particularly in the area of employment 
discrimination.15   Will the Ninth Circuit follow its precedent and affirm this massive 
class, which could lead to billions of dollars in damages or result in an enormous 
monetary settlement?   Or will the Ninth Circuit take into account precedent from 
other circuit courts and apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which may cause 
a denial of the class and ultimately force the claims to be brought in individual trials?  
The decision of the Ninth Circuit will have far-reaching consequences impacting our 
current legal system, particularly in employment discrimination class action 
certification decisions.  The pending decision will also influence corporate America, 
its policies, and employer-employee relations.   
This article will explore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their 
application in the granting or denial of certification in an employment discrimination 
class action.  In doing so, this article will examine how the district court applied 
these rules in the Wal-Mart action, which resulted in the certification of the largest 
private class action suit in American history.16  Additionally, this article will consider 
the consequences of the Ninth Circuit’s utilization of permissive and liberal 
standards and, alternatively, the consequences of incorporation of stricter standards 
from various other circuit courts and the possible result of denial of certification. 
Part II will give a general background on Wal-Mart, the pending Wal-Mart 
litigation, and the Civil Rights Act the plaintiffs are alleging Wal-Mart violated. Part 
III will provide an overview of the requirements for certification set out in Rules 
23(a), 23(b), and 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This part will assert 
various contemporary views of class actions and their consequences.  Part IV will 
                                                                
13Ritu Bhatnagar, Recent Development: Dukes v. Wal-Mart as a Catalyst for Social 
Activism, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 246, 247 (2004). 
14Sue Reisinger, Wal-Mart at Critical Juncture, Sex Bias Plaintiffs Seek Class Status,
NAT’L L. J., June 23, 2003, at 1.
15See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998); Linney v. Cellular 
Alaska Pshp., 151 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998); Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 
1276 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 626 (9th 
Cir. 1982)). 
16See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142. 
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analyze the pending litigation and relate it to the factors most likely to be reviewed 
by the Ninth Circuit.  This part will analyze the precedent of the Ninth Circuit in 
certification decisions and explore the possible issues that may be arise if this 
precedent is followed.  In addition, Part IV will analyze the reasons that warrant the 
Ninth Circuit to expand its review and to stray from its permissive precedent in order 
for this case to receive a fair review.  The issues and consequences of an appellate 
denial will also be explored.   
Finally, Part V will conclude that a case of this size deserves an expansive and 
thorough review in order to adequately and to fairly protect the claims of the 1.6 
million women in the class.  Despite the probability of an affirmation by the Ninth 
Circuit, this article will speculate that the action may not be found to meet the Rule 
23 requirements and, thus, should not go forward.  A more thorough review is 
deserved in this case, since the Ninth Circuit’s decision will invoke substantial 
consequences for future cases. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Wal-Mart: The Largest Retailer and Employer
There is considerable variation in opinion regarding defendant Wal-Mart, both 
the largest retailer and the largest employer in the world.17  In 2004, Fortune 
magazine named Wal-Mart the “Most Admired Company” for the second 
consecutive year.18  Despite this title, Wal-Mart is the defendant in over 5,000 
lawsuits, more than any other company in the United States19 and is also the object of 
public criticism alleging bias against women and subjection of workers to overtime 
work without pay.20   Questions regarding Wal-Mart’s influence on society were 
apparent when CNBC aired a television show titled “The Age of Wal-Mart: Inside 
America’s Most Powerful Company,”21 which considered whether Wal-Mart is 
“ultimately good or bad for America.”22  Likewise, concerns were apparent when the 
University of California at Santa Barbara conducted an entire conference to 
                                                                
17See id. at 141. 
18Wal-Mart Website, News: U.S. Operations, http://www.walmartstores.com.
19The Age of Wal-Mart (CNBC News television broadcast Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter 
The Age of Wal-Mart]. 
20Wal-Mart’s CEO on Offensive Against Critics: Wal-Mart's CEO Lee Scott Goes on 
Offensive Against Critics of Its Employment Policies, ABC BUS., Jan. 13, 2005. 
21The Age of Wal-Mart, supra note 19.
22Id.
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contemplate Wal-Mart’s impact on society.23  In spite of the array of criticisms, Wal-
Mart remains a dominant leader in the global business community.24
Sam Walton founded Wal-Mart on three principle beliefs: to show respect for 
the individual, to serve customers, and to strive for excellence.25  The retailer’s 
current philosophy still emphasizes these beliefs.26  Wal-Mart believes that respect 
for the individual has substantially contributed to its current economic success and 
industry recognition through “a group of dedicated, hardworking, ordinary people 
who have teamed together to accomplish extraordinary things.”27  Its success is also 
attributed to customer service, which is emphasized within Wal-Mart’s culture.  Wal-
Mart wants customers “to find the lowest prices with the best possible service.”28
Wal-Mart credits its ongoing success to constant innovations, ideas, and pushing of 
the boundaries promoted by Sam Walton’s “concept of striving for excellence before 
it became a fashionable concept."29
Recently, Wal-Mart’s CEO and President, H. Lee Scott, began an aggressive 
marketing campaign to present the “unfiltered truth” about the world’s largest 
retailer.30  On January 13, 2005, for the first time since its founding, Wal-Mart 
responded to public criticisms and the creation of an “urban legend”31 with an open-
                                                                
23On April 12, 2004, a national conference, “Wal-Mart: Template for 21st Century 
Capitalism” was held at University of California, Santa Barbara.  The conference discussed 
Wal-Mart’s impact on society as well as the capitalist business world.  The conference 
featured scholars, activists, and union officials.  See Press Release, UCSB to Host National 
Conference on Wal-Mart as Model for 21st Century Global Capitalism (Mar. 24, 2004), at
http://www.ia.ucsb.edu/pa/Display.aspx?PKey=1119, March 24, 2004.  See also The Age of 
Wal-Mart, supra note 19. 
24As of January 2005, there are 1,363 Wal-Mart stores, 1,672 Wal-Mart Super Centers, 
550 Sam’s Clubs, and 76 Neighboring Markets, which employ over 1.2 million associates.  In 
2004, Wal-Mart’s financial success could be observed through the generation of over $256 
billion in global sales (an increase of $26 billion over the previous year), $9.1 billion in net 
income and an increase in earnings per share by more than 15 percent.  See Wal-Mart Stores 
Website, Wal-Mart Stores at a Glance, http://www.walmartstores.com.   
25Wal-Mart Stores Website, The Wal-Mart Culture – The Story of Wal-Mart, 
http://www.walmartstores.com.
26Id.
27Wal-Mart Stores Website, The Wal-Mart Culture – Three Basic Beliefs, 
http://www.walmartstores.com (quoting Don Soderquist, former Senior Vice Chairman of 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. who is now retired). 
28Id. (quoting Tom Coughlin the Vice Chairman of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc). 
29Id. (quoting Lee Scott the President and Chief Executive Officer of Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc).
30Lorrie Grant, Wal-Mart CEO Vows 'Unfiltered Truth', USA TODAY, Jan. 13, 2005, at 
1B.
31In attempts to revamp its image, Wal-Mart created the website www.walmartfacts.com 
in order to present the facts about Wal-Mart and counter recent criticism.  In a January 13, 
2005 press release posted on the website, CEO and President Lee Scott is quoted stating, 
“There are lots of ‘urban legends’ going around these days about Wal-Mart, but facts are 
facts.”  These urban legends are negative opinions, statements, and criticisms regarding Wal-
Mart’s effect on consumers, employees, the community and the economy.  Another article 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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letter advertisement in over 100 newspapers and a number of media interviews.32
Wal-Mart also created a website, www.walmartfacts.com, to present statistics about 
the retailer, including the number and size of stores, number of associates, and 
average wage for full-time hourly workers.33  Scott stated that the goals of 2004 were 
taking care of customers, associates, communications and merchandising.34  The 
outcome of the appeal of the certification granted in the Dukes litigation will have a 
significant influence on both future legal decisions and corporate policies because of 
the current notoriety and cultural fascination with  Wal-Mart. 
B. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Litigation History 
In Dukes, the plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (Wal-Mart)35 engaged in 
sex discrimination against female employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.36 According to the Plaintiffs’ Third Amended 
Complaint, the class challenges the hiring, promotion, and pay practices of Wal-
Mart, specifically the practices of “advancing male employees more quickly than 
female employees, denying female employees equal job assignments, promotions, 
training and compensation, and by retaliating against those who oppose its unlawful 
practices.”37  Summarily, the plaintiffs allege that through company-wide polices of 
discrimination against female employees, promotion and compensation variances 
have been created between female and male employees.  The plaintiffs seek “plain 
class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, lost pay, and punitive damages.”38  They 
are not seeking compensatory damages for the class members.39
On June 22, 2004, U.S. District Judge Martin Jenkins of San Francisco approved 
the certification of the class in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,40 finding at least “an 
                                                          
posted on the website, “Wal-Mart is Working For Everyone.  Some of our Critics are only 
Working for Themselves,” further considers that special interest groups and critics spread 
rumors and misfortunes about Wal-Mart for their own benefit and Wal-Mart feels that the 
public deserves to hear the truth and be able to see proof of the good Wal-Mart does for 
consumers, employees, communities, and the economy.  See Press Release, Wal-Mart 
Launches Nationwide Campaign to Set the Record Straight, Jan. 13, 2005, at
http://www.walmartfacts.com/docs/747_jan13release_1416847257.pdf.   
32See id.
33See id.
34See id.
35The class members consist of females who were employed by any Wal-Mart retailer 
during the specific years mentioned.  These retailers included in the class action include Wal-
Mart stores, Wal-Mart discount stores, supercenters, neighborhood stores, and Sam’s Clubs.  
See Wal-Mart Class Website, supra note 11. 
36See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141.  
37Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, (N.D. Cal. 2001) (No. C-01-
2252MJJ); see also Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141.     
38Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141.  
39Id.
40The representation in this noted suit is unique, especially the plaintiffs’ combination of 
nonprofit groups and plaintiffs’ firms.  The plaintiffs’ representation is a mix of both three 
nonprofit groups and four plaintiffs’ firms, which bring different perspectives, advantages, and 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss4/10
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inference [that] Wal-Mart engages in discriminatory practices in compensation or 
promotion.”41  The court certified the class of “all women employed at any Wal-Mart 
domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, who have been or may be 
subjected to Wal-Mart's challenged pay and management track promotions policies 
and practices,” for purposes of liability, injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive 
damages, and lost pay.42
C. Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1991 Amendment 
The challengers allege that retail giant Wal-Mart’s employment practices 
and policies were discriminatory43 and that they violated Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,44 which “intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form 
which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the 
basis of race, religion, sex or national origin."45  The Act has a dual purpose.  Its 
first purpose is “to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white 
employees over other employees.”46 The second purpose is to “make whole” a 
victim of unlawful employment discrimination by placing the employee in as 
good a position as he or she would have been if the discrimination had not taken 
place.47
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which only allowed for equitable relief in the 
form of injunctive, declaratory, and front and back pay, was amended in 1991 to 
allow for further monetary damages, including punitive and compensatory 
relief.48  This amendment caused some to believe that the supposed focus of 
injunctive relief, to end the discriminatory behavior of the employer and to make 
positive changes in employment practices, had been shifted to compensating 
                                                          
resources to the challengers of Wal-Mart’s policies.  The three non-profit groups representing 
the plaintiffs are The Impact Fund, Equal Rights Advocates, and The Public Justice Center.  
The plaintiffs’ firms which are working together with the nonprofit groups are the following: 
Cohen, Milstein, Hasufeld and Toll of Washington; Davis, Cowell & Bowe of San Francisco; 
and Tinkler & Firth and Merit Bennett P.C., both of Santa Fe, New Mexico.  Counsel 
defending Wal-Mart is Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker of Los Angeles, which is one of the 
largest and most successful labor and employment firms in the nation.  See generally Dukes,
222 F.R.D. at 137; see also Wal-Mart Class Website, supra note 1. 
41Nathan Koppel, Firms, Nonprofit Team in ‘Wal-Mart’: Is Pairing the Plaintiff’s 
Lawyers Merely to Hide a Motive for Profit?,  NAT’L L. J., Aug. 16, 2004, at 7. 
42Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 163-64. 
43Id. at 141. 
44Id.
45Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976). 
46Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). 
47Franks, 424 U.S. at 763-64. 
48See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (2000).  Congress amended the Act after finding that 
“additional remedies under federal law are needed to . . . deter intentional discrimination in the 
workplace.” Pollard v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852 (2001).  
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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individual employees.49  In Dukes, the plaintiffs’ class action claim of a violation 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was certified after the district court’s analysis of 
the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to the case.50
III. THE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE OF CLASS ACTIONS AND MODERN 
COMMENTARY 
A. Background of Rule 23(a): Prerequisites to a Class Action 
Class action lawsuits are used to efficiently and effectively handle a large 
number of litigants through class representatives.51  In order to certify a class, the 
plaintiff carries the burden of proving that the requirements of both Rule 23(a) and 
23(b) have been sufficiently met.52   When determining whether or not to certify a 
class, the district court has “broad discretion,” which must be exercised “within Rule 
23’s framework.”53  The four requirements of 23(a) are numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation.54  In order to certify a class action suit, the 
district court must conduct “a rigorous analysis” of whether the plaintiffs have 
adequately satisfied all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a).55  The numerosity 
requirement is met when joinder of all members of the class would be impractical 
due to the large number of individuals involved in the suit.56  It should be noted that 
the judiciary has not set a numeric standard as to how many members will satisfy the 
numerosity prerequisite.  Instead, the court makes numerosity determinations on a 
case-by-case basis.57   The prerequisite of commonality requires “questions of fact or 
law that are common to the class.”  This requirement is generally met “with a 
common nucleus of operative fact.”58  Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement is 
established only if the representatives prove that their claims are typical of the claims 
of the entire class.59  The typicality requirement will be met when the plaintiffs’ 
claims “arise from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to 
the claims of other class members.”60  Finally, adequacy of representation requires 
                                                                
49See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON 
L. REV. 813, 837 (2004). 
50See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143. 
51STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 425-26 (6th ed. 2003). 
52See Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.R.D. 430, 436 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
53Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. And Corr., 81 Fed.Appx. 550, 555 (6th Cir. 2003).  
54Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
55Reeb, 81 Fed.App’x. at 555. 
56Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 
57BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 51 at 428.
58Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 436. 
59Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 
60Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 436 (quoting Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 
1998)); see also Bullock v. Bd. of Educ., 210 F.R.D. 556, 560 (Md. D. 2002). 
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that the representatives fairly and adequately protect the interests of all members of 
the class.61  Once plaintiffs meet the burden of proof for the four requirements of 
23(a), they must then prove “that they fall within at least one of the subcategories of 
Rule 23(b).”62
B. Background of Rule 23(b): Class Actions Maintainable 
In addition to the prerequisites of 23(a), the proposed plaintiff class must fit into 
one of 23(b)’s classes in order for the district court to grant certification.   
Certification can be granted if 23(b)(1) is sufficiently met.  Rule 23(b)(1) is applied 
when individual litigation of the claims will result in a disposal of the interests of 
other potential plaintiffs or a prevention of their ability to recover.63  The textbook 
example of a 23(b)(1) class is when relief from individual lawsuits exhausts a limited 
fund available for relief of the claim to the disadvantage of other future plaintiffs.64
Since employment discrimination class actions have the primary purpose of ending 
and rectifying discriminatory behavior, rather than providing monetary relief,65 most 
employment discrimination claims are not established on a limited fund.  A class can 
also be certified under 23(b)(1) if the opponent to the class would be subject to 
incompatible duties or inconsistent standards.66 In employment discrimination cases, 
the opponent to the class has the duty or standard not to discriminate in employment.  
As such, certifying because of incompatible duties or inconsistent standards is 
unlikely.67  Rule 23(b)(1) will generally be inapplicable to certify a class in an 
employment discrimination setting.68
Employment discrimination class action suits typically seek certification under 
either the 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) class types.69  Rule 23(b)(2) allows certification of a 
class when the primary relief sought by the plaintiffs is equitable.70  In order for 
                                                                
61FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).  See Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 436 (stating that the two inquiries 
of Rule 23(a)(4) are “the plaintiffs named counsel” and “the named plaintiff’s representation 
in protecting the distinct interests of the class members”). 
62Elkins v. Am. Showa, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 414, 419 (S.D. Ohio 1996). 
63BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 51, at 438.
64See, e.g., Trautz v. Weisman, 846 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that the 
classic rule for a Rule 23(b)(1) case occurs when claims of individuals exhaust the value of a 
limited fund, to the detriment of subsequent plaintiffs). 
65Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (“It was to achieve 
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to 
favor an identifiable group to the detriment of another.”).  
66See BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 51, at 438-39.  
67Id.
68Smith v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 338, 372 (S.D. Miss. 2003). 
69See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 869-70 (1984) (noting that an 
employment discrimination claim could be properly certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 
and (3)); see also Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding class 
actions alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2000)., are frequently certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)). 
70FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
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certification under 23(b)(2), the class as a whole must have a general claim against 
the opposing party and seek either declaratory or injunctive relief.71  Furthermore, 
under Rule (b)(2), the relief sought must be predominantly equitable (injunctive or 
declaratory) in nature, which causes discrepancies in interpretation and decision-
making among various courts.72  Though equitable relief must be the primary relief 
sought, this does not exclude a class from also seeking other relief such as monetary 
damages.73
According to Newberg on Class Actions, certification through 23(b)(3) is 
appropriate “when a class action is superior to other available methods for 
adjudication of the controversy and common questions predominate over the 
individual ones."74   There are two requirements that must be satisfied in order for a 
claim to be certified under 23(b)(3).  First, the class members’ common questions of 
law or fact must predominate over any individual member’s questions of law or 
fact.75  Second, under Rule 23(b)(3), the class action must be the “superior means of 
adjucating the controversy.”76   A court may find the class action as the superior 
means for settling the claim by looking at  various factors such as the efficiency of 
judicial recourses and whether individual suits will be ineffective for the members of 
the class.77  For example, a class action is the superior method for a claim where an 
individual may not have even been aware of his or her potential legal claims in the 
absence of a class certification and notice.78  However, a court’s certification 
decision under Rule 23(a) and (b) is not absolute; review of a district court’s decision 
may be appropriate on appeal under Rule 23(f).79
                                                                
71Id.
72See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
(concluding that the court must determine whether injunctive or declaratory relief 
predominates); see also James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 570 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that plaintiffs “must demonstrate that their class action suit seeks predominantly injunctive 
relief rather than monetary damages”).
73In re Paxil Litig., 218 F.R.D. 242, 247 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ( “[C]lasses are not prohibited 
from seeking monetary relief, but certification of such classes is inappropriate where the 
monetary relief sought predominates over the injunctive relief being sought.”). 
741 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.01(3d ed. 
1992).
75See id. See also Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (stating that 
the predominance requirement is not satisfied if there are significant questions which pertain 
only to a subset of the class or individual members of the class). 
76See BAICKER-MCKEE  ET AL., supra note 51, at  442. 
77See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
7832B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2001 (2004); see, e.g., Abramovitz. v. Ahern, 96 
F.R.D 208 (D. Conn. 1982)  (noting that some class members may have had no idea that they 
were among individuals illegally wiretapped by the defendants, thus class members would not 
have been aware of potential legal claims in the absence of the class action). 
79FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
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C. Background of Rule 23(f): Appeals 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) governs the right for an interlocutory 
appeal of a district court’s decision to grant or deny certification of a claim under 
Rule 23.80  Under 23(f), a certification decision can be appealed before the end of the 
litigation in district court.81  Rule 23(f) does not express standards for courts to use in 
granting an appeal of the certification decision.82  Permission to appeal may be 
granted or denied on the basis of any consideration that an appellate court finds 
persuasive.83 Despite Rule 23(f)’s novelty, circuit courts have begun developing their 
own standards as to the appropriateness of permitting appeal to diminish the 
“opportunities for abuse” in class actions suits.84
There are four typical situations in which circuit courts have granted a Rule 
23(f) review.85  First, if an individual's claims could not realistically go forward after 
denial of certification and the decision was questionable, the district court’s 
decisions is more likely to be reviewed.86  This first situation is demonstrated when a 
district court’s denial of certification creates higher costs for individual litigation, 
thus preventing a proposed individual member from litigating his or her claims.87
Second, circuit courts have been likely to review a certification decision if the 
district court’s decision is questionable and causes a weighted pressure for the 
defendant to settle the case, regardless of the case’s actual merits.88   Third, circuit 
courts may be more likely to grant review of the certification decision if it will help 
to further develop class action law.89  Circuit courts differ in opinion as to whether 
                                                                
80See id.
81See id.  This rule allows the district court’s decision to be appealed on an interlocutory 
basis, thus the parties do not have to wait until the litigation at the district court is finalized to 
appeal the certification decision.  See also BAICKER-MCKEE, supra note 51, at 452. 
82See Hart, supra note 49, at 837.   
83The courts of appeals have "unfettered discretion" to grant or deny permission to appeal
based on "any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) 
advisory committee's notes. 
84Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1981). 
85BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 51, at 452-53. 
86See, e.g., In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding 
review of certification is likely if the denial of the certification is the “death knell” for the 
claim and the district court’s decision was questionable); Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 
70, 81 (2d. Cir. 2004) (focusing solely on the first basis for granting interlocutory review 
under Rule 23(f) “that the certification order will effectively terminate the litigation and there 
has been a substantial showing that the district court's decision is questionable") (emphasis 
added).
87See Hevesi, 366 F.3d at 81.  
88See, e.g., id; see also Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999). 
89BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 51, at 442.  See, e.g., Equifax Check Services, 181 
F.3d at 835.  The court states that the advisory committee and the standing committee are 
anticipating that appeals under Rule 23(f) will further class action law through, solving 
certification problems and presenting others, thus making proposed amendments to Rule 23 
unnecessary. Id. The court also states that “[w]hen the justification for interlocutory review is 
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the decision made by the district court in granting or denying the certification needs 
to be questionable to grant review.90   Finally, it is probable that a circuit court will 
grant review when either party is able to make apparent that the decision was a clear 
error.91  Customarily, review of the certification decision is most likely to be granted 
when the district court’s decision was centered on a novel or unsettled question of 
law or when the decision is the “death knell” for the action.92  Overall, 23(f) expands 
the options of litigants who are trying to certify or to oppose certification because 
many times the ultimate decision to deny certification ends the litigation entirely.93
In Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that review of the 
Northern District of California’s certification decision was appropriate under Rule 
23(f). 
D. Class Action Suits and Settlements: Contemporary Opinions, Beliefs and 
Criticisms 
Class action lawsuits are "unique creatures with enormous potential for good 
and evil."94 Recently, scholars have observed a “significant and increasing hostility 
to the class action mechanism.”95  Those who generally object to class actions feel 
that “class actions are used to force settlement of meritless claims” and class actions 
tend to be “tools of collusion between defendants and plaintiffs’ counsel.”96
Another growing criticism of class actions is that if injunctive relief, theoretically the 
                                                          
contributing to development of the law, it is less important to show that the district judge's 
decision is shaky. Law may develop through affirmances as well as through reversals. Id.
Some questions have not received appellate treatment because they are trivial; these are poor 
candidates for the use of Rule 23(f). But the more fundamental the question and the greater the 
likelihood that it will escape effective disposition at the end of the case, the more appropriate 
is an appeal under Rule 23(f).” Id.
90See, e.g., Equifax Check Servs., 181 F.3d at 835.  But see In re Lorazepam & 
Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding that there should 
be evidence of some error of the district court to grant interlocutory appeal, even when 
anticipating the review will advance and develop law regarding class actions); In re Sumitomo 
Copper Litig., 262 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)  (holding that there must be the possibility of 
a district court error before an appeal will be granted staying the district courts litigation 
proceedings). The court will not issue an appeal “unless the likelihood of error on the part of 
the district court tips the balance of hardships in favor of the party seeking the stay.” Id. 
91See, e.g., Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding 
that despite the other factors for review not being present, clear error by the district court may 
be proper). 
92FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note. 
93Michael P. Shea, Appealing Class Certification Rulings, CONN. LAW TRIB., Nov. 15, 
2004, at 9. 
94Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1979) (Fay, J., specially 
concurring).  
95Stephen D. Susman, Class Actions: Consumer Sword Turned Corporate Shield, 2003 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2 (2003).  
96Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77 (2003). 
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main purpose of an employment discrimination class action, is not judicially 
enforced, then “there is often scant incentive for employers to produce substantive 
change.”97  For example, in Home Depot v. Butler,98 the plaintiffs received average 
monetary relief of $9,683, but there were no specific positions made available for the 
members of the class.  Essentially, Home Depot failed to meet the diversity 
benchmarks and judicial oversight regarding the injunctive relief has since ceased.99
Noted cases such as these further the criticisms about employment discrimination 
class actions.   
In spite of these criticisms, other scholars still regard class actions as an 
important litigation tool, and they believe in the ability of class actions to achieve 
five primary goals.  These goals include (1) facilitating  judicial economy, (2) 
affording  a remedy to victims who cannot obtain relief through individual actions, 
(3) spreading  the costs of litigation in order to enhance access to the courts, (4) 
protecting defendants from multiple, inconsistent verdicts, and (5) adequately 
protecting the interests of absent class members.100
Despite differences in opinion, class actions, especially employment 
discrimination class actions, tend to end in settlement.  For example, employers such 
as Home Depot, Boeing, Winn-Dixie, Amtrak, UPS, and Pennzoil have settled class 
action claims in recent years for millions of dollars.101  One reason why employment 
class action suits tend to settle is the publicity created by certification.  This publicity 
generates pressure on the defendants to settle the claims.  Despite unwarranted 
pressures, “[s]ettlements should reflect the relative merits of the parties’ claims, not 
surrender to the vagaries of an utterly unpredictable and burdensome litigation 
procedure.”102  This recent commentary is related to the pending Wal-Mart litigation, 
since Wal-Mart is facing billions of dollars in backpay and punitive relief.  If 
certification is affirmed, Wal-Mart will have to decide if the potential damages 
impose such an immense pressure that a settlement will be more beneficial than 
defending the Wal-Mart name at trial.  Furthermore, if certification leads to 
settlement, the court will not have the opportunity to determine if Wal-Mart’s 
practices were truly discriminatory through the actual facts and merits of the case.
                                                                
97Bhatnagar, supra note 13, at 253. 
98Home Depot v. Butler, No. C-94-4335, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16296 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
29, 1997). 
99Tristin Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional 
Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 684-85 (2003). 
100See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 427 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting).
101Lesley Frider Wolf, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1847 (2000); see Griffin v. Home Depot, 168 
F.R.D. 187 (E.D. La. 1996).  
102Allison, 151 F.3d at 422. 
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF THE DUKES V. WAL-MART
CERTIFICATION DECISION
A. Pending Litigation
On August 13, 2004, the Ninth Circuit granted Wal-Mart permission to appeal 
the certification of the plaintiffs’ class in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc..103  The 
appeal appeal is expected to occur in the spring of 2005.104  Until the Ninth Circuit 
reviews the certification, trial proceedings have been stayed.105  On December 29, 
2004, the lead lawyer for the plaintiff’s representation, Brad Seligman, advanced the 
pending litigation as he filed papers justifying affirmation of the certification of the 
Ninth Circuit.106  The defense is arguing that the certification should be overturned 
under various rationales including “billions of dollars in backpay and punitive 
damages [that are sought by the plaintiff class], as well as a lack of disparity in pay 
in over 90% of its stores.107   The importance of the Ninth Circuit’s review of the 
certification is evident as Seligman states, “[t]he class certification decision is the 
most important thing that is going to happen in this case short of a jury verdict.”108
An affirmation of the certification will either cause the case to proceed to trial or 
create a “threat of exposure to . . . [an extremely large sum of] damage awards,” 
which may cause an “overwhelming pressure to settle.”109
The Ninth Circuit will review the trial court’s finding that the requirements of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b) were sufficiently established 
for certification of the class.  In reviewing the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the Ninth 
Circuit will have to review the determination that numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation were established.110  If the Ninth Circuit 
court agrees that Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites were sufficiently established by the 
plaintiffs, it will proceed to review of the 23(b) requirements.   
B. Analysis: Review of Rule 23(a) Prerequisites 
The Ninth Circuit conducts a self-confessed “very limited” review and will 
reverse only upon a strong showing that the district court’s decision was “a clear 
                                                                
103Federal Appeals Court Allows Wal-Mart Appeal Of Class Certification, 4-12
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. CLASS ACTIONS 22 (2004).  
104Id.
105Id.
106Court Asked To Affirm Wal-Mart Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at C4. 
107Id.
108See Shea, supra note 93, at 9 (quoting Brad Seligman, counsel for plaintiffs in sex 
discrimination suit against Wal-Mart). 
109Id.
110See Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 664 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that under 
Rule 23(f) the circuit court will review the determinations regarding application of Rules 23(a) 
and (b) to the certification decision made by the district court). 
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abuse of discretion.”111  Perceptibly favoring plaintiffs,  the Ninth Circuit will only 
overturn decisions if their factual findings  are clearly erroneous.112  Despite the 
Ninth Circuit’s permissiveness in reviewing certification decisions, there is 
precedent suggesting that Wal-Mart’s argument warrants a reversal of the 
certification decision.  A careful and thorough review is necessary because although 
decisions are discretionary, “a court abuses its discretion if its certification order is 
premised on legal error.”113  Furthermore, the Dukes case has such publicity and far-
reaching consequences that the Ninth Circuit will need to rigorously analyze the 
district court’s compliance with Rule 23.114
In review of Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites, a court normally begins review with 
23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement.  For numerosity to be satisfied, “[p]laintiffs do 
not need to state the exact number of potential class members, nor is a specific 
number of class members required.”115 A district court is to use its best discretion 
and judgment in determining whether a joinder is impractical—a decision that 
satisfies the numerosity requirement.116 However, at the district court level, Wal-
Mart did not contest that numerosity was met since both parties estimated a proposed 
class of well over one million women.117   Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit does not 
need to conduct a rigorous analysis of the numerosity requirement.  A previous Ninth 
Circuit case, Staton v. Boeing Co., found “no dispute that the numerosity 
requirement is met . . . [with] approximately 15,000 in number,”118 therefore 
furthering the view that a class of over 1.6 million quite undeniably meets the 
numerosity requirements of 23(a)(1). 
The Ninth Circuit will have to conduct a thorough review of the commonality 
requirement, which focuses on the relationship of common facts and legal issues 
among class members.119  There are numerous factors that a court may consider 
when determining whether Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement can be met.  
These factors include: 
                                                                
111Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship., 151 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998).  See Class 
Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Officers for Justice v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1982)).  
112Linney, 151 F.3d at 1238. 
113Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2001). 
114See Reeb, 81 Fed. App’x at 555. 
115Bates v. United Parcel Serv., 204 F.R.D. 440, 444 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
116Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2000). 
117Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 144.  The Court concluded that “it is beyond dispute that joinder 
would be impracticable in this case.” Id. The Court further proceeded to find that this factor is 
satisfied. Id.
118Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2003);  see also Gunnells v. 
Healthplan Servs., 348 F.3d 417, 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding "1400 employees plus their 
families covered by the Plan, with possibly 2900 unpaid claims, ‘easily’ satisfied Rule 
23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement”); ROBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 3:3 
(4th ed. 2002). Where the exact size of the class is unknown but general knowledge and 
common sense indicate that it is large, the numerosity requirement is satisfied. 
119See BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 51, at  429. 
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(1) the nature of the unlawful employment practice charged and whether it 
particularly affects a few employees or has class-wide impact; (2) the 
uniformity or diversity of the employment practices, considering work 
force size, the number of facilities, the variety of employment conditions, 
occupations and work activities; (3) the uniformity or diversity of the 
class membership and whether the alleged discriminatory treatment 
involves common questions; (4) the nature of the defendant’s 
management organization as it relates to the degree of centralization and 
uniformity of employment and personnel policies and practices; and (5) 
the length of time the claims span and whether similar claims prevailed 
through that period.120
In finding sufficient evidence for a “minimal”121 showing of commonality, the 
district court in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., examined three categories of 
evidence presented by the plaintiffs. Included in this evidence were “(1) facts and 
expert opinion supporting the existence of company-wide policies and practices; (2) 
expert statistical evidence of class-wide gender disparities attributable to 
discrimination; and (3) anecdotal evidence from class members around the country 
of discriminatory attitudes held or tolerated by management.”122  The court found 
that there was sufficient evidence of a common practice of compensating and 
promoting employees across the nation.  The plaintiffs contend that this common 
practice was affected by “excessive subjectivity which provides a conduit for gender 
bias that affects all class members in a similar fashion and a strong corporate culture 
that includes gender stereotyping.”123
The debate over facets of the commonality requirement will likely be contested 
and reviewed by the Ninth Circuit.  One such issue is the district court’s finding that 
the plaintiffs met the commonality requirement through an aggregation of the 
plaintiffs’ provided evidence. The court found that evidence aggregated together 
creates an “inference that Wal-Mart engages in discriminatory practices in 
compensation and promotion that affect all plaintiffs in a common manner.”124
However, the linkage of evidence demonstrating a corporate culture that cultivates 
discrimination or gender stereotyping is minimal.  Citing Shipes v. Trinity Industries,
the court stated that the “use of entirely subjective personnel processes that operate 
to discriminate, satisfy the commonality . . . requiremen[t] of 23(a),” however, here 
the plaintiff provided no concrete evidence that Wal-Mart’s subjective practices 
“operate to discriminate.”125  Instead, the plaintiffs utilized their own expert’s 
                                                                
120Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
121The Court found that, “indeed, the necessary showing to satisfy commonality is 
‘minimal.’” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit only 
required plaintiffs to demonstrate commonality through shared legal issues, but divergent facts 
or shared common facts, but claim for relief can be based on different legal theories. Dukes,
222 F.R.D. at 145. 
122Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145.   
123Id.
124Id. at 166. 
125Id. at 150. 
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conclusion that “Wal-Mart is ‘vulnerable’ to gender bias,”126 formulated through his 
combining of the “understanding of the scientific community with evidence of 
Defendant’s policies and practices.”127
 Wal-Mart’s contention that “the pay and promotions [of Wal-Mart] are too 
decentralized to create any questions common to the class” will likely be 
reassessed.128  Both parties generally agree that pay and promotion decisions for in-
store employees are made in a largely subjective manner, but the fine points create 
many disagreements.129  The decision that these subjective policies allow a finding of 
commonality may be reviewed, as many courts do not allow subjective decision-
making to evince a class-wide common issue.130  The members of the certified class 
on appeal worked at approximately 3,400 stores, in 40-53 separate departments, 
including eight specialty departments that operate as semi-autonomous units within 
the stores.131  Previous decisions have utilized a more narrow designation of 
commonality and denied certification to large nationwide employment 
discrimination classes.132
In Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., certification was denied 
due to decentralized decision-making and wide geographic distribution.  The court 
said there was “little in common with class members spread over so many stores in 
so many states with so many different managers responsible for making the 
challenged employment decisions."133  In Rhodes, the alleged discrimination was 
                                                                
126Dukes, 22 F.R.D. at 154 (emphasis added). 
127Id.
128Id. at 145.  
129Id.
130See, e.g., Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 526, 540-42 (N.D. Ala. 2001); 
 Abram v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 200 F.R.D. 424, 430 (E.D. Wis. 2001) ("[T]he 
decision to permit some consideration of subjective factors is not, in and of itself, a 
discriminatory practice that provides the unifying thread necessary for 'commonality' to 
exist.").  
131Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145-46. 
132See EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 
("[A] decision by a company to give managers the discretion to make employment decisions, 
and the subsequent exercise of that discretion by some managers in a discriminatory manner, 
is not tantamount to a systematic, company-wide policy of intentional discrimination."), aff'd,
191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999). 
133Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619, 676 (N.D. Ga. 
2003). The court also listed a number of other cases where commonality was not found due to 
geographic diversity, an absence of centralized decision-making, or where different decision-
makers made the challenged decisions.  See, e.g., Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 
267, 278-80 (4th Cir. 1980); Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558, 567 (W.D. Wash. 
2001); Beck v. Boeing Co., 203 F.R.D. 459, 463-64 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Cooper v. S. Co., 
205 F.R.D. 596, 611 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Abram v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 200 F.R.D. 
424, 432-33 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, 201 F.R.D. 526, 540-52 (N.D. 
Ala. 2001); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 478-79 (S.D. Ohio 2001); 
Lott v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 200 F.R.D. 539, 555-56 (D.S.C. 2000); Troupe v. 
Randall's Food & Drugs, Inc., No. 3:98-CV-2462-p, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11620 (N.D. Tex. 
July 28, 1999); Betts v. Sundstrand Corp., No. 97 C 50188, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9743, 
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affected by decision making in 450 stores in over 41 states,134 which is slight in 
comparison to the approximately 3,400 Wal-Mart stores relevant to this litigation.135
Another example of a denial of certification due to a failure of proving commonality 
is Reed v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., where the court found “highly 
localized” employment policies did not satisfy the commonality test.136  The Ninth 
Circuit will have to analyze the inherit tension between a finding of a common 
centralized employment practice utilized throughout Wal-Mart’s stores and the 
allegation of “excessive subjectivity” used in promotion and compensation decisions 
resulting in the alleged discriminatory conduct.137  Within the Ninth Circuit’s limited 
review, the court will determine if this inherent tension, which Wal-Mart describes 
as “absurd and contrary to law,”138 causes reason to find that commonality is not met.   
A review of the district court’s finding of the commonality requirement may be 
appropriate with respect to promotion practices since “both parties agree that 
subjectivity is a primary feature of promotion decisions for in-store employees.”139
Recently, the Sixth Circuit denied certification in a racial employment discrimination 
suit finding that differing promotion criteria to the wide array of jobs held by the 
class members precluded a finding of commonality.140  In Bacon, the court required 
the plaintiffs to prove the defendant utilized a discriminatory promotion policy 
applicable to all workers "through an entirely subjective decision-making process."141
The court stated that when objective criteria play a role in an employer’s promotion 
policies, these policies are no longer subjective in nature.142  Comparatively, Wal-
Mart employs corporate guidelines for promotion decisions such as, “requirements 
that candidates have an ‘above average’ evaluation, have at least one year in their 
current position, be current on training, not be in a ‘high shrink’ department or store, 
be on the company’s ‘rising star’ list, and be willing to relocate.”143  According to 
                                                          
(N.D. Ill. June 21, 1999); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 238-
40 (W.D. Tex. 1999); Bostron v. Apfel, 182 F.R.D. 188, 195-96 (D. Md. 1998); Reyes v. Walt 
Disney World Co., 176 F.R.D. 654, 658 (M.D. Fla. 1998);  Boykin v. Viacom, Inc., No. 96 
CIV. 8559, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17872 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1997); Abrams v. Kelsey-
Seybold Med. Group, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 116, 130-31 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Appleton v. Deloitte & 
Touche LLP, 168 F.R.D. 221, 231-32 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); Lumpkin v. E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 161 F.R.D. 480, 482 (M.D. Ga. 1995). 
134Rhodes, 213 F.R.D. at 681. 
135Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142. 
136Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aero. Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
137See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166. 
138Id.
139Id.
140Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2004). 
141Id. at 571. 
142Id. at 572. 
143Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 148.  
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Bacon, these guidelines, even if “minimum requirements of advancement,”144 defeat 
a finding of a common practice which puts all workers “under one umbrella.”145
There were many findings and inferences made by the district court that will 
likely be reviewed, since other courts have held that “enormous diversity of . . . 
purported class[es] defeats a finding of commonality,” and classes that  “include 
such a wide range of employees, subject to such a wide range of [evaluatory] criteria 
[cause] . . . any commonality which might have existed amongst a narrower class of 
persons [to be] defeated.”146  Despite precedent that has applied a stricter 
commonality standard, the Ninth Circuit’s limited review may affirm the finding of 
sufficient commonality, creating a more lenient and broad commonality standard that 
may be followed in future class actions decisions.   
Another area in which review by the Ninth Circuit may be pertinent is the 
difference between the statistical evidence presented by the plaintiffs and the 
statistical evidence provided by Wal-Mart.  Courts’ use of statistical evidence to 
satisfy commonality “is well accepted”147 and, therefore, the review should be on the 
level of analysis conducted to produce the statistical evidence.  The plaintiffs’ expert 
analyzed data at a regional level, while the defendant’s expert analyzed the 
employment statistics at a store sub-unit level.  The difference in the parties’ analysis 
caused discrepancies in the findings of compensation differences and therefore 
discriminatory conduct.  The plaintiffs’ expert found a discrepancy in pay between 
men and women, which indicated a general policy of discrimination,148 while the 
defendant’s expert found minimal discrepancies in pay between the genders.149  The 
Ninth Circuit will analyze whether the utilization of the plaintiffs’ analysis and 
evidence, which is contradicted by the defense, was sufficient to facilitate the finding 
of commonality.   
Although other commonality factors may hinder the finding of commonality, the 
defendant’s opposition to the aggregation of the statistical data and its utilization in 
satisfying Rule 23 is unlikely to influence the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  The circuit 
courts have allowed aggregated data to influence Rule 23’s satisfaction on many 
occasions. In Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., the Fifth Circuit allowed aggregated 
statistical data, and furthermore stated that data should not be disaggregated  “to the 
point where it was difficult to demonstrate statistical significance.”150  The court 
found that disaggregating allowed a party to fragment the data into such small groups 
that the tests became less probative.151  Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found 
that “[p]ooling data is sometimes not only appropriate but necessary, since statistical 
                                                                
144Id.
145Bacon, 370 F.3d at 571. 
146Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558, 566 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
147Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154.  
148Id. at 156. 
149Id.
150Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 654-56 (5th Cir. 1983). 
151Id.
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significance becomes harder to attain as the sample size shrinks,” furthering the view 
that aggregated data is sufficient for use in class certifications.152
Finally, the Ninth Circuit previously stated that the plaintiff should not be 
required to provide disaggregated data if the disaggregated groups were smaller than 
the group that is allegedly “similarly situated and affected by common policies.”153
The Court added, the "plaintiffs' theory is that the employment practices have an 
identical discriminatory effect upon members of all minority groups . . . right or 
wrong, they are entitled to prove their case."154  This precedent seems to advance the 
plaintiffs’ argument that aggregated statistical analysis satisfies Rule 23 and 
therefore established certification.  The defense argues that district courts have found 
that aggregate statistical analysis is not sufficient to satisfy the commonality 
requirement.  The defense cites one case in particular, Abram v. UPS of America., 
Inc., which found that an aggregate statistical analysis “masks the differences from 
district to district and from supervisor to supervisor that preclude a finding of 
‘commonality.”155 Despite the defense’s argument that their statistical evidence 
should preclude commonality as they found no statistically significant evidence of 
discrimination,156 the Ninth Circuit will likely affirm the district court’s use of the 
plaintiffs’ statistical evidence due to precedent from both the Ninth Circuit and other 
federal circuit courts. 
As noted by the Supreme Court, “the commonality and typicality requirements . 
. . tend to merge.”157 The commonality and typicality requirements are used to 
establish whether “a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's 
claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members 
will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”158  When a court finds 
sufficient evidence to support the establishment of commonality, that finding 
generally tends to support a finding of typicality.159 Similar to their commonality 
analysis, the Ninth Circuit tends to analyze the 23(a) requirement of typicality 
leniently.160  In Dukes, the district court found that the named plaintiffs suffered from 
the same specific discriminatory practice as the proposed members of the class under 
“an alleged common practice . . . [of] excessively subjective decision-making in a 
                                                                
152Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 541 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing  D. BALDUS &
J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 9.221, at 309 (1980)) ("All other things 
being equal, the test statistic and level of significance rise as the sample size increases."). 
153Paige v. State of Cal., 291 F.3d 1141, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting D. BALDUS &
J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 7.0-7.2 (1980 & 1986 Supp.)). 
154Id.
155Abram, 200 F.R.D. at 431. 
156See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 164-65. 
157Id. at 144. 
158Id.
159Von Colln v. County of Ventura, 189 F.R.D. 583, 591 (C.D. Cal. 1999); see Gen. Tel. 
Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982) (“[T]he commonality and typicality requirements of 
Rule 23(a) tend to merge.”).
160Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.   
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corporate culture of uniformity and gender stereotyping,” satisfying the typicality 
requirement.161  If the Ninth Circuit follows the same lenient methodology regarding 
typicality, the deliberation on review of the standard will be minimal. 
There are prior decisions, however, that may cause debate and the potential for 
review regarding 23(a)(3)’s typicality prerequisite.  One area in which review may 
be pertinent is ensuring that the proposed members have similar claims, which are 
not overly fact-specific so as to defeat typicality.  In Staton v. Boeing Co., “[t]he 
named plaintiffs . . . include[d] a very broadly selected cross-section of the different 
categories of Boeing employees” and with this wide variety of employees in the 
proposed class, “this cross-section of Boeing employees suffice[d] to insure that the 
interests of these sub-groups . . .  [met] the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a).”162
The named plaintiffs in the Wal-Mart case are primarily hourly employees, with one 
representative in a lower-level salaried managerial position and no representatives in 
high-level managerial positions.163  Another facet of the typicality requirement in 
which review may be pertinent is in the plaintiffs’ allegation of characteristic class-
wide discriminatory practices.  According to Stevens v. Harper, the “plaintiffs may 
not obtain class certification based on unsupported allegations of system wide 
violations, especially when they rely on such allegations not only to establish 
commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a) but also to demonstrate the propriety of 
class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).”164  The Ninth Circuit may review the 
evidence presented regarding the alleged discriminatory practices and policies due to 
the finding that they are “vulnerable” to gender bias by the plaintiffs’ expert.165  The 
plaintiffs’ expert declared Wal-Mart vulnerable to gender bias, but did not actually 
confirm or substantiate a finding that Wal-Mart is gender biased.  This lack of 
material evidence may raise similarities to Steven v. Harper, which may weaken or 
preclude a finding of typicality. 
The final Rule 23 prerequisite that the Circuit Court may conduct review upon is 
23(a)(4), adequacy of representation.  The Ninth Circuit must verify that the 
“representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”166
In reviewing 23(a)(4), there are two inquiries on which the court will focus: first, that 
the named counsel adequately protects the named interests of the class members, and 
second, that the named plaintiffs represent the distinct interests of the unnamed class 
members.167   The Supreme Court found that the named plaintiffs representing a class 
                                                                
161Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167-68. 
162Staton, 327 F.3d at 957. 
163Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167-68. 
164Stevens v. Harper, 213 F.R.D. 358, 378 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
165Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154;  see, e.g., J.B. v Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1289 (10th Cir. 
1999) (declining to allow general allegations of systematic failures to meet the requirements of 
23(a)).
166FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(4);  see Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 
1992).
167Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 46; see also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 
F.2d 285, 291 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding that adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4) is 
measured with regard to both class counsel and class representatives). 
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“must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as 
the class members."168 The Ninth Circuit will have to appraise the 23(a)(4) 
requirement in order to verify the district court’s finding that there are not conflicts 
of interest within the case, which reduces the chances of certification or precludes 
certification of the class.169  Wal-Mart asserts that there are potential conflicts of 
interest that may bar the class from certification.170 The Ninth Circuit will likely 
review potential conflicts, such as a conflict between the alleged victims of 
discrimination and possible alleged discriminators being represented in the same 
class,171 as well as both management and non-management employees included in 
the plaintiff class.172
Precedent varies about whether potential conflicts within the class such as those 
mentioned herein are adequate to deny certification.  Courts have found that a 
“conflict of interest may arise where a class contains both supervisory and non-
supervisory employees.”173  The courts have also considered the situation where 
members of the proposed class were accountable for the evaluation and decisions 
such as compensation or promotions, which the class is alleging as discriminatory, 
much like the situation in the pending Wal-Mart litigation.174  In some situations, the 
courts have found that “concern about this potential conflict of interest is another 
factor that weighs against certification.”175
However, other courts have held that “the question of whether employees at 
different levels of the internal hierarchy have potentially conflicting interests is 
context-specific and depends upon the particular claims alleged in a case.”176  The 
Ninth Circuit will have to determine if the specific context of the litigation seems to 
create substantial occasion for conflict within the plaintiffs’ class.  The district court 
was not “persuaded that there [were] any substantive conflicts between supervisory 
                                                                
168E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).
169Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement inquires into conflicts of interest which exist 
between named parties and that classes they represent.  Thus a conflict of interest shows that 
the class representative may not possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the 
class members weighing against certification of the class.  See Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 n.13 (1982).   
170Wal-Mart claims that a conflict of interest exists among the female in-store managers 
who made the decisions, which were alleged discriminatory and also are part of the plaintiff 
class. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 168.
171A female employee who held a position which took part in the alleged subjective 
decision making of compensation of promotion decisions would qualify as a member of the 
plaintiff class.  This member of the class would be seeking relief from their own employment 
actions. Id.
172See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 168. 
173See, e.g., Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558, 568 (W.D. Wash. 2001); 
Gonzalez v. Brady, 136 F.R.D. 329, 333 (D.C. 1991); Appleton v. Deloitte and Touche, LLP, 
168 F.R.D. 221, 233 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
174Appleton, 168 F.R.D. at 233. 
175Id.
176Staton, 327 F.3d at 958. 
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and non-supervisory employees that would preclude certification.”177  The Ninth 
Circuit’s perception about the significance of the potential conflicts will bear 
substantial importance because it previously held that “[s]peculative potential 
conflicts rarely form the basis of denial of class certification.”178  If the Ninth Circuit 
perceives these conflicts as conceivable, but without substantial threat of occurrence, 
they will likely not weigh against certification. 
The second inquiry of 23(a)(4) adequacy of representation, the adequacy of 
counsel, will not go under review by the Ninth Circuit.179  The court will not have to 
review the qualifications of the plaintiffs’ counsel, since the defense did not contest 
this portion of the requirement.  The district court noted that the plaintiffs’ counsel 
has the experience, capacity, willingness and dedication required to bring a claim of 
this magnitude.180
C. Analysis: Review of Rule 23(b) Requirements
If the Ninth Circuit finds that the “prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied,” the 
court will proceed to review the district court’s finding that the “plaintiffs . . . fall 
within at least one of the subcategories of Rule 23(b).”181  The district court was 
satisfied that the “proposed class was maintainable under . . .Rule 23(b)(2),”182
concluding that “equitable relief predominates over the claim for punitive 
damages”183 and that the liability and remedy phases of the litigation are “not 
rendered unmanageable by the size of the proposed class.”184  It is likely that both of 
these (b)(2) findings will be reviewed during the interlocutory appeal, as the defense 
urges that the “[d]istrict court misapplied Rule 23(b).”185   The Ninth Circuit will 
also evaluate whether the class seeks “predominately” injunctive or declaratory 
relief, which is necessary for certification under Rule 23(b)(2).186  In the present 
action, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, backpay, and punitive damages,187
causing debate over which form of relief predominates.  The district court found that 
the plaintiffs were primarily seeking to change Wal-Mart’s allegedly discriminatory 
policies and practices, rather than seeking to obtain punitive damages.188  In the past, 
                                                                
177Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 168. 
178Cummings v. Connell, 1999 WL 1256772, 4 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see Social Servs. 
Union, Local 535 v. County of Santa Clara, 609 F.2d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1979); Blackie v. 
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975).
179Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 46.  
180See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 169. 
181Elkins, 219 F.R.D. at 419.  
182Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 170. 
183Id. at 171. 
184Id. at 173. 
185Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 137.  
186Beck v. Boeing Co., 203 F.R.D. 459, 465 (D. Wash. 2001). 
187See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 170. 
188Id. at 171.  
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proposed 23(b)(2) employment discrimination class actions regularly have been 
rejected because courts have found that monetary relief predominates over injunctive 
relief.189   The Fifth Circuit found that injunctive relief predominating over equitable 
relief serves a dual purpose: “first, it protects the legitimate interests of potential 
class members who might wish to pursue their monetary claims individually; and 
second, it preserves the legal system’s interest in judicial economy.”190  Furthermore, 
the Fifth Circuit found monetary relief should be incidental to injunctive or 
declaratory relief and ideally available only when “class members automatically 
would be entitled once liability to the class (or subclass) as a whole is 
established.”191
Further inconsistencies are evident as the Supreme Court indicated the 
possibility of certification under (b)(2) as being per se unavailable when monetary 
damages are sought,192 while the Second Circuit has utilized a more flexible 
approach.193  The Second Circuit focuses on “the positive weight or value to the 
plaintiffs of the injunctive or declaratory relief” and compares this to the weight and 
value of the compensatory or punitive damages also sought.194
The Ninth Circuit’s previous decisions regarding certification under Rule 
23(b)(2) have tended to be permissive compared to those of other circuit courts.  In a 
recent decision, the Ninth Circuit applied a different test to Rule 23(b)(2), allowing 
certification when monetary damages were sought, as long as they were “secondary” 
to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.195 The Molski court defined secondary 
as when damages “flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims 
forming the basis of injunctive relief.”196  During interlocutory appeal of the Wal-
Mart litigation, the court will have to analyze the evidence that compensation and 
promotion decisions were made by thousands of local managers across the company 
and whether this subjective decision making affected the class members uniformly, 
thus entitling them to injunctive or declaratory relief.  The Ninth Circuit will also 
have to decide if it wants to maintain use of this “secondary” test, or instead use a 
more bright-line predominance test commonly utilized in other circuit courts.197
                                                                
189Alison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).  
190Id. at 415. 
191See id. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); Murray 
v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001).
192Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994) (suggesting the possibility that 
in actions where monetary damages are sought, certification may only be permissible through 
23(b)(3)).
193See Hart, supra note 49, at 829.  
194Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2nd Cir. 2001).
195Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 2003). 
196Id. at  949. 
197Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.  But see Molski, 318 F.3d 937, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(indicating that the ninth circuit would not adopt a bright-line standard and instead utilized the 
“secondary” test).   
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The Ninth Circuit will also have to review the fact that the class consists of both 
former and current employees and determine what effect this has on the satisfaction 
of a predominance or secondary test.  Other courts interpreting decisions such as the 
pending Wal-Mart litigation have denied certification for failing a predominance 
requirement when both current and former employees sought monetary damages.198
In Morgan v. Metropolitan District Commissioner, the court found that former 
employees could not “meaningfully benefit from the declaratory relief” the proposed 
class sought.199  In Morgan, the plaintiff class conceded that injunctive and 
declaratory relief were more suitable for “present employees looking into the future 
to prevent future harm”200 rather than for former employees.  Additionally, the court 
found that the primary incentive for former employees to join a class action was 
monetary damages, which weighs against satisfaction of the predominance 
requirement.201  The Wal-Mart action includes both former and present employees,202
thus the court will have to question whether a class including former employees has 
a primary incentive of injunctive or declaratory relief.  Utilizing the Ninth Circuit’s 
“secondary test,”203 the district court found that the main goal of the litigation was 
obtaining new policies and practices at Wal-Mart, in seeming disregard of the fact 
that former employee class members cannot benefit from this injunctive and 
declaratory relief.204  The Ninth Circuit will need to closely scrutinize the fact that 
many former employees are included in this class and will further need to decide 
how other circuit courts’ decisions will affect their analysis. 
For certification to be granted under Rule 23(b), the judicial proceedings of the 
class action must be manageable.  A court must have the ability to oversee the case 
in a responsible and reasonable manner,205 and a court has wide discretion in its 
determination of whether it possesses this ability.206  Rule 23(b) does not have an 
express requirement of manageability,207 but the district court found manageability is 
                                                                
198See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Faibisch v. Univ. of 
Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 
999, 1007 (11th Cir. 1997); Morgan v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 222 F.R.D. 220, 236 (D. Conn. 
2004).
199Morgan v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 222 F.R.D. 220, 236 (D. Conn. 2004). 
200Id.
201Id.
202See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141. 
203Id. at 171. 
204Id.
205Id. at 173. 
206Id. (citing Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 n.22 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
207Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) has an express requirement of class actions 
being the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.  The Rule 
expresses that “the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class action,” 
are pertinent to the certification decision. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  However, 23(b)(2) does 
not have an express requirement of manageability, but some courts, specifically the Ninth 
Circuit in the Wal-Mart action, have found this requirement implicit and thus it must be met 
for certification under Rule 23(b)(2). See also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lord, 
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“implicit in any type of class certification.”208  The Ninth Circuit will have to analyze 
whether the class, massive in both number and geographic size,209 is manageable.  
The district court analyzed the manageability of the Wal-Mart action in two stages, 
the liability stage and the remedy stage.210  The court found that at the liability stage 
the plaintiffs must prove that the defendant, against the class as a whole, entered into 
a practice or policy of discrimination.211  The district court determined that the 
liability stage would be manageable because statistical evidence could provide the 
evidence and proof needed for a continuation to the remedy stage of the case.212  The 
Ninth Circuit will need to review this decision and determine if contested statistical 
evidence is sufficient to determine liability in a case of this magnitude.  If the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the finding that the statistical and anecdotal evidence used to satisfy 
23(a) was sufficient, it is likely that this same evidence will be admissible in proving 
that the defendants entered into a policy of discrimination against the class as a 
whole. 
In the remedy stage, the court must determine whether there are manageability 
issues regarding relief to the plaintiff class.  The district court found that distribution 
of relief, whether injunctive or backpay, will be manageable if the defendant is found 
liable.  However, the court found that relief for discriminatory promotion practices 
will be manageable only to a distinct group of class members and will not be 
distributed class-wide. Since Wal-Mart did not contest the finding that an injunctive 
remedy is manageable, the Ninth Circuit will not conduct review of this portion of 
relief.  Wal-Mart argues that providing backpay213 to the plaintiff members would be 
                                                          
585 F.2d 860, 866 (8th Cir. 1978) (assuming that there is an implied condition of 
manageability in class actions under paragraph (b)(2) also). 
208Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 173, (citing Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164) (noting that a district 
court may allow (b)(2) certification if "class treatment would be efficient and manageable, 
thereby achieving an appreciable measure of judicial economy"); see also Piva v. Xerox 
Corp., 70 F.R.D. 378, 388 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (noting that proposed 23(b)(2) class of employees 
in western region "directly involves important considerations of manageability"). 
209In a Letter Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council 
Supporting Petition for Permission to Appeal From Order Granting Class Certification, the 
unprecedented sheer size of the class was specifically addressed.  The EEAC stressed that the 
class should be found unmanageable, as the “potential size of the class is so large that the case 
becomes virtually unmanageable, denying to both plaintiffs and defendant any prospect that 
their claims will receive a fair and prompt resolution.”  The EEAC also addresses immense 
size of the class through the following comparisons. First, there are more members of the class 
than there are persons in the United States Armed Forces. See Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, Armed Forces Strength Figures, http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/
military/ms0.pdf.  Second, there are more members than total resident populations of 12 of the 
50 states. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, http://eire.census.gov/popest/data/ 
states/tables/NST-EST2003-01.pdf.  Finally, the class is approximately the same size as 
combined paid attendance for the last twenty Super Bowls. See Super Bowl Website, 
http://www.superbowl.com/history/boxscores. 
210See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 173; see also Robinson, 267 F.3d at 158. 
211See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 173.  
212Id. at 174. 
213Backpay is usually awarded in order to “effectuate the statutory goal [of Title VII] of 
compensating the victimized employee and placing him in as good a position as he would 
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completely unmanageable.214 However, the district court and plaintiffs agree that 
backpay is manageable by using of a formula approach.215  A formula approach 
allows a court to utilize objective data to determine which individuals deserve a 
remedy and the amount of the remedy to be distributed.  The Ninth Circuit must 
address whether the formula approach to awarding backpay is acceptable, and if it is 
not, if the traditional method that is normally used would render the backpay remedy 
unmanageable.
Wal-Mart strongly contests awarding backpay using a formula method.  
According to Wal-Mart, use of the formula approach completely disregards the 
defense’s right to “demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor” and, thus, that “the court…[should] 
not award damages.”  In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., the 
Supreme Court stated that the defendant employer is given the opportunity to 
demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for 
lawful reasons.216  Wal-Mart believes that since the Teamster approach is 
“impractical” and “unfeasible”217 on a class-wide basis, the remedy phase is 
unmanageable or unfeasible.218  The Ninth Circuit will have to review the district 
court’s finding that the remedy phase, while utilizing a formula approach, is fair and 
manageable.  The Ninth Circuit will most likely follow precedent and state that 
“‘individualized hearings’ are not required in all Title VII class actions.”  In 
Kraszewski v. State Farm General Insurance Co., the court found that a class-wide 
formula for determination of damages is available to “avoid a ‘quagmire of 
hypothetical judgments’ or the strain of a multitude of separate fact-finding 
hearings.”219  If the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court’s findings at the remedy 
phase, such a decision will enhance the probability of the certification being affirmed 
under 23(b)(2). 
D. Analysis: What Will the Ninth Circuit Decide and the Impending Consequences 
After examining previous Ninth Circuit decisions, it is apparent that precedent 
favors the plaintiffs in Dukes v. Wal-Mart.  Both the Northern District of California 
                                                          
have been had he not been subject to discrimination."  See Dukes, 222 F.R.D.  at 174 (citing to 
Stewart v. General Motors Co., 542 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1976)). 
214See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 174. 
215Id. at 166-67. 
216Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S.  324, 362 (1977); see Franks v. Bowman 
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778-79 (1976). 
217The plaintiff found that individual hearing for the members of the class who may been 
entitled to backpay is impractical.  The defense argues that if they are not entitled to this 
defense to show that policies were lawful, the remedy phase in unmanageable. Dukes, 222 
F.R.D. at 176. 
218See Beck, 203 F.R.D. at 467 (stating that regarding backpay damages, a class action 
cannot fairly and economically resolve the issue without individualized hearings into the 
specific circumstances of each person's employment and what the discrimination to which 
they have been subjected). 
219Id. See Kraszewski v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22604 (N.D. 
Cal. 1986).
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and the Ninth Circuit tend to favor leniency in application of the certification 
standards of Rule 23.220  According to precedent, the Ninth Circuit will review the 
district court’s decision and affirm the decision unless there was a clear abuse of 
discretion.221  If the district court applied the proper standards and did not make any 
clearly erroneous findings of fact, its decision will stand.222  As such,  in order for 
certification to be denied on appeal, Wal-Mart must prove that either the court 
analyzed the evidence against an incorrect legal standard or that the district court 
committed clear error in the fact finding process.  To the dismay of Wal-Mart,  the 
Ninth Circuit will conduct an “extremely limited” review, which will hinder Wal-
Mart’s  argument that a clear error was committed and  that the certification decision 
must be overturned. 
If the Ninth Circuit conducts a more expansive review of the district court’s 
findings, it may realize that the certification rests upon legal uncertainties.  For 
example, in review of the commonality standard, is there a class wide policy of 
discrimination in both compensation and promotion decisions?  Without any hard 
evidence of a strong corporate culture infused with policies encouraging or even 
tolerating discrimination,223 can every store have managers in decision making 
positions that practice discrimination in both promotion and compensation decisions?  
The district court found commonality was met as Wal-Mart utilized subjective 
decision-making at the store level.224  Yet, there is no evidence of a nation-wide 
policy to be permeated into every store and every decision maker at the stores.225
This is one area in which more extensive review is warranted since the claims could 
have been brought against the separate store locales instead of all Wal-Mart locations 
across the country.  Claims brought on a smaller scale, such as against a specific 
store, will be more likely to establish whether there is a clear discriminatory practice 
or policy detrimental to the women employees at that retail location.  
Moreover, a broad review of the commonality standard may be warranted when 
analyzing the evidence used to satisfy the requirement.  The Ninth Circuit will have 
to decide if a nation-wide aggregate analysis of compensation and promotion policies 
is proper when the decisions allegedly at issue were primarily made at the store level.  
Aggregate analyses may be appropriate when the decisions are made at a centralized 
corporate level, but when the decisions are subjectively made by management 
employees at the sub-unit level, an unaggregated analysis may be more appropriate.   
More extensive review of the district court’s finding that there were no conflicts 
of interest precluding Rule 23(a)(4)’s satisfaction may also be appropriate.  Other 
circuit courts have found that a conflict of interest, such as a certifying a class where 
                                                                
220See supra note 15.  
221See Molski, 318 F.3d at 947-48. 
222Id. at 953 (citing Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 213 F.3d 454, 
458 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
223See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151.  The district court finds a nexus between a strong 
emphasis on uniform corporate culture and an environment that may include gender 
stereotyping.  Id. However, hard evidence of gender bias or stereotyping was not presented. Id.
224See id. at 150. 
225Id. at 152-53. 
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the alleged discriminatory decision makers are also entitled to relief as class 
members, precludes or hinders Rule 23(a)(4) being met.226   The Ninth Circuit should 
conduct a thorough review on this requirement as the plaintiff class includes those 
who made the contested compensation and promotion decisions.   
Review of this certification decision is imperative due to the immense 
consequences associated with certification.  First, an affirmance of certification may 
encourage the filing of class actions, specifically employment discrimination claims.  
Certification of a class this large, using permissive analysis favorable to the plaintiffs 
makes class action suits more attractive litigation options.  Also, these permissive 
standards used by the district court will more likely be applied to future class action 
decisions.  If the certification decision is affirmed, this case may be followed in the 
future allowing huge monetary damages to be remedied in employment 
discrimination suits to become the norm.  Certification of a discrimination suit with 
potential relief in the billions of dollars is unprecedented227 and may cause a trend of 
leniency in the allowance of monetary relief sought.  Furthermore, monumental 
monetary damages are seemingly contradictory to the main purpose of an 
employment discrimination lawsuit, stopping the discriminatory behavior and 
preventing it from future reoccurrence.228  An affirmation of certification may cause 
the intentions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be diminished, as monetary damages 
may begin to take a larger role in the claims for relief. 
A thorough review that precludes certification may also be appropriate due to 
the trend towards settlement of claims involving classes of this size.  As legal 
commentary has revealed, there is an apparent tendency for defendants to settle class 
actions to avoid the possibility of vast monetary relief and extensive negative media 
attention.229  If this case is settled, Wal-Mart will have potential monetary and 
injunctive outlays, without a finding that they actually committed the alleged 
discriminatory conduct.  A settlement will contradict the plaintiffs’ purpose of 
discontinuing the allegedly discriminatory practices and creating a workplace that 
values gender equality.  
V. CONCLUSION
The review of the certification decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart will significantly 
influence how employment discrimination class actions are managed in the 
American legal system.  This case is deserving of a thorough review, as it will 
influence the application of Rule 23 in future class action certification decisions.  
Dukes v. Wal-Mart warrants that the Ninth Circuit diverge from the precedented 
“limited review” since there are many discrepancies regarding the application of 
certification requirements within the various circuit courts.   If the certification is 
granted upon a permissive review, consequences such as a trend toward certification 
when monumental monetary relief is sought, settlement without basis on the merits 
of the case, and a trend toward leniency in certification of employment 
discrimination class action lawsuits may soon follow.  The many inconsistencies in 
                                                                
226Id. at 167-68. 
227Id. at 142. 
228See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
229See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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employment discrimination decisions described above make apparent the possibility 
of misapplication of Rule 23 or the use of an incorrect legal standard. Therefore, the 
certification decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart should be given a well-deserved 
thorough review to avoid substantial inadvertent consequences.  
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